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The author surveys and discusses recent decisions and legislation
touching on all aspects of commercial law. Among the topics
dealt with are decisions arising under various provisions of the
UCC, products liability, negotiable instruments, mortgage and
banking law, and newly enacted consumer and commercial legis-
lation on both the state and federal levels.
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I INTRODUCTION
This survey' attempts to cover all cases and legislation encom-
passed by the ever spreading umbrella of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) as well as areas outside of the UCC but within commer-
cial law practice.
II. SALE OF GOODS
A. Goods
A contract for the compiling, editing, and publishing of pam-
phlets by a printer has been construed to refer to the sale of goods.'
Likewise, a contract for the furnishing of fabricated steel pipe to a
construction site has been held to be for the sale of goods rather than
a furnishing of services.'
1. This survey covers the cases reported in volumes 316 So.2d through 338 So. 2d and
federal and Florida legislation enacted in 1976.
2. Lake Wales Publishing Co. v. Florida Visitor, Inc., 335 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
3. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. North Am. Steel Corp., 335 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1976); FLA. STAT. § 762.105 (1975).
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B. Jurisdiction and Foreign Sellers
A single large ($41,999.95) mail-order purchase of goods from a
foreign corporate seller, which does not have "the necessary sub-
stantial connection with the forum state so as to make the exercise
of jurisdiction reasonable and consonant with the due process tenets
'of fair play and substantial justice,'" will not be sufficient for substi-
tuted service of process upon the corporation on the basis that it was
allegedly carrying on a business or a business venture in Florida.
Under subsections (1) and (3) of Florida Statutes section 48.181
(1975), in order to secure jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation
which manufactured goods that allegedly caused harm in Florida,
it is necessary to allege and prove that the manufacturer had control
over brokers, jobbers, wholesalers or distributors or control over the
goods in the hands of these parties. The element of control is deter-
minative.'
In the absence of a statute, an officer-salesman who sells goods
in Florida for a foreign corporation has been held not personally
bound on the contract, even though his corporation has not qualified
to do business in Florida.' The fact that the corporation cannot sue
on the sales contract because it has not qualified to do business
neither affects the title to the goods sold nor imposes liability upon
the individual who carried out the sales transaction.
C. Statute of Frauds
When an owner of land orally guarantees payment of a sub-
contractor's debt to a materialman in return for the materialman's
continuing to furnish materials to the construction site and refrain-
ing from filing a lien against the property, the Statute of Frauds
section of the UCC (section 2-201)1 has been held to be inapplica-
ble.' Assuming (without deciding) that a sale of goods had taken
place, there would have been a receipt and acceptance of the goods
delivered after the making of the oral guaranty, thus satisfying UCC
4. Elmex Corp. v. Atlantic Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 325 So. 2d 58, 63 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1976).
5. AB CTC v. Morejon, 324 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1975).
6. Mysels v. Barry, 332 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
7. FLA. STAT. § 672.201 (1975).
8. Jim & Slim's Tool Supply, Inc. v. Metro Communities Corp., 328 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1976).
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section 2-201(3)(c).' Further, those goods furnished prior to the
making of the oral guaranty would not have been delivered pursuant
to a contract for sale under UCC section 2-106; 10 hence, the Statute
of Frauds section would not have been applicable. The court in the
instant case also upheld the validity of the oral guaranty under
Florida's general Statute of Frauds. It reasoned that the material-
man's agreement not to file a lien against the property was a new
consideration flowing to the guarantor-owner and since this was the
"leading object" which was to benefit the promisor-guarantor, it
was not within the purview of a promise to pay the debt of another
under section 725.01 of the Florida, Statutes (1975).
D. Products Liability
In a landmark opinion, Wet v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.," the
Supreme Court of Florida in response to certified questions from the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, adopted section 402(A) of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. The court held that a manufacturer
is strictly liable in tort when it places an article on the market
knowing that the article is to be used without inspection for defects,
and it has a defect which causes injury to a foreseeable bystander
when he comes within the range of danger. The contributory or
comparative negligence of the victim can be a defense to the manu-
facturer if it arises other than by a failure of the user to discover the
defect in the goods or a failure to guard against the existence of the
defect. Thus, the consumer, user, or bystander is still required to
exercise ordinary care. The court further held that the bystander-
victim could use the theory of breach of an implied warranty of
merchantibility against the manufacturer even though there was
not any privity of contract between them. In such a case, the manu-
facturer would have the same defenses of contributory negligence
and comparative negligence as it would have under strict liability
in tort principles. It is to noted that the court deliberately extended
the range of 402(A) to include bystanders even though the drafters
of the Restatement had taken no position on that issue. 2 The court
also stated that a suit under Restatement (Second) of Torts, section
9. FLA. STAT. § 672.201(3)(c) (1975).
10. FLA. STAT. § 672.106 (1975).
11. 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A), Caveat(l) (1965).
[Vol. 31:895
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402(A) eliminates the notice requirement found under the UCC
(section 2-607(3)(a)), 13 restricts or eliminates the effectiveness of
disclaimers, and abolishes the privity requirement. Inasmuch as
causes of action under section 402(A) and breach of warranty were
concurrent remedies under the West case, pre-West warranty cases
will have a continuing viability.
A pre-West complaint alleged that a retailer sold fabric to a
minor's mother which was used by her to make kitchen draperies
which subsequently exploded and burst into flames when the minor
was attempting to put some hot paraffin into the kitchen sink. The
court held that, in alleging that the fabric was a dangerous instru-
mentality with dangerous and defective characteristics, the com-
plaint stated a cause of action by the minor against the retailer
despite a lack of privity.'4 Today, a count under section 402(A)
would also seem appropriate. In another decision, however, the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal for the Second District, in the course of affirm-
ing a jury verdict in favor of a bottler in a "bug-in-the-bottle" case,
discussed the liability of the retailer and bottler under negligence
and implied warranty theories with a seeming unawareness of UCC
sections 2-314 and 2-315.11 One would hope that at least one of the
clerks of the court would have had a nodding acquaintance with
Florida Statutory law. 6
The Supreme Court of Florida has affirmed the Third District
decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho, 7 holding that a manufac-
turer of automobiles must use reasonable care in the design and
manufacture of its vehicles in order to prevent secondary impact
injuries to passengers when the vehicle is involved in a primary
collision with another vehicle or object. The manufacturer, however,
is not to be held obligated to build a "crash-proof" or "fool-proof"
car; hence, the liability of the manufacturer is not based on breach
of an implied warranty or on strict liability in tort principles, but
rather upon a breach of a duty of reasonable care.
A federal district court (in attempting to apply Florida law) has
held that an importer of foreign cars cannot be held liable under an
13. FLA. STAT. § 672.607(3)(a) (1975).
14. Dudley v. Mae's Discount Fabrics, 323 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
15. FLA. STAT. § 672.314-315 (1975).
16. Tarwacki v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 330 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
17. Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho, 327 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976), aff'g Evancho v. Thiel, 299
So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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implied warranty that the car was equipped with crashworthy
seats.'" The court noted that a Florida court in the Evancho case had
imposed such a warranty upon the manufacturer of a car, but the
court was of the view that the importer had no ability to control the
design and manufacturing process and therefore should not be held
to the same standard of care as a manufacturer. The force of the
opinion is weakened by the fact that the court was obviously op-
posed to the whole notion of car crashworthiness, whether asserted
against the manufacturer or importer.
An electrical utility company owes a nondelegable high degree
of care to employees of an independent contractor who work with
the company's facilities. On the other hand, a shopping center
which has a central switchboard containing numerous electrical
meters which are used to measure electricity consumed by lessees
which is supplied by a city generating system is not to be equated
with an electrical utility, and its required degree of care is simply
ordinary care. 9
It is reversible error for the trial court judge to charge the jury
in a suit being tried against the principle manufacturer and compo-
nent part manufacturers for negligent design, manufacture, and
assembly of a crane that the jury could not find against the manu-
facturers "[i]f ... there were no set safety standards, in 1966, and
those safety devices recommended were not in use in the industry.''0
It is interesting to note that the quoted language was actually in a
question written by the jury and sent to the judge, to which he had
responded in the negative.
A buyer of defective goods sued his retailer who impleaded the
manufacturer as a third-party defendant.2 ' The buyer was granted
judgment against the retailer who was granted judgment against the
manufacturer. The buyer's subsequent attempt to refuse satisfac-
tion of his judgment against the retailer in order to enable him to
bring an action directly against the manufacturer was refused on
appeal. The First District Court of Appeal reasoned that, because
the first suit against the retailer and manufacturer involved essen-
tially the same issues as the proposed second suit against the manu-
18. Smith v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 116 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
19. Lake Parker Mall, Inc. v. Carson, 327 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
20. Jones v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 323 So. 2d 633, 634 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
21. Billman v. Nova Products, Inc., 328 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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facturer and since a favorable final judgment had been obtained in
the first suit, the plaintiff was collaterally estopped from relitigating
the same issues.
Even though a plaintiff's complaint alleged that the defen-
dant's truck driver was actively negligent in driving a truck which
collided with the plaintiff's car, the defendant was not prevented
from filing a third party complaint against the manufacturer of its
truck alleging that the manufacturer was actively negligent in the
manufacture and design of the truck's electrical system and that the
manufacturer breached warranties (the nature of which were not
revealed in the opinion)."
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, stated in a rather
oblique manner that a car manufacturer may be liable in negligence
and/or for breach of implied warranty to a person who is struck by
a car as the result of a failure of the master brake cylinder in the
car.23 Inasmuch as the ruling arose in the appeal of an order granting
a new trial, the statement is hardly binding.
Florida Statutes section 440.11(2) (1975) provides that an em-
ployer's workmen's compensation carrier, service agent, or safety
consultant shall not be liable as a third party tortfeasor for assisting
the employer in carrying out its duties of furnishing safety inspec-
tions, consultive services, or other safety services. This section does
not preclude the estate of a deceased workman of a subsidiary corpo-
ration from suing the parent corporation for its alleged negligent
manufacture of a dangerous machine supplied to the subsidiary
corporation simply because the parent corporation also supplied
inspections or instructions incidental to the supplying of the ma-
chine .2
In appropriate cases the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be
used in products liability cases, but before the jury can infer neg-
ligence, it must be charged and must conclude that the "instru-
mentality causing an injury was in the exclusive control of the de-
fendant at the time the negligent act or omission . . . occurred. 125
In addition, the court must instruct the jury that if it concludes,
after it has taken into consideration all of the evidence in the case,
22. Central Truck Lines, Inc. v. White Motor Corp., 316 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
23. Ford Motor Co. v. Berger, 321 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
24. Greene v. Ivaco Indus., Ltd., 334 So. 2d 347 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
25. Auto Specialties Mfg. Co. v. Boutwell, 335 So. 2d 291, 292 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976),
quoting Florida Standard Jury Instruction 4.6.
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that the occurrence was not due to any negligence upon the part of
the manufacturer, it may not infer negligence upon the part of the
manufacturer. Florida Standard Jury Instruction 4.6 should be
followed closely, since any deviation therefrom may result in rever-
sible error.
In a pair of exploding soft-drink bottle cases, the Third District
held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (which is predicated upon
an object's being in the exclusive control of a defendant) may be
used if the victim is able to produce sufficient evidence of careful
handling of the bottle from the time it left the bottler's control until
the time of the explosion. The victim was not obliged "to do the
impossible by accounting for every moment of a bottle's existence
from the time it leaves a defendant manufacturer's possession and
control. ... ,2 This possessory aspect of the res ipsa rule has been
stretched to include a case where a truck tire blew out after having
been driven 9,520 miles, when the buyer testified that the tire,
which had been in his control for one month, had not been driven
in an under-inflated condition or subjected to abuse.27 Inasmuch as
the buyer alleged that the personnel of the defendant tire company
had made representations regarding the durability of the tire, it is
strange that the suit was not based upon breach of express and
implied warranties rather than on action in negligence. The use of
the res ipsa doctrine would seem rather strained in this instance.
In a case of apparent first impression in Florida, it was held
that when a manufacturer of an elevator also installs and maintains
it in a building owned by another, and the elevator falls and injures
a passenger, the victim may assert the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
in a suit against the manufacturer." The court noted that such a
cause of action would lie even though the maintenance contract
between the owner of the building and the elevator manufacturer
provided that the owner of the building was to be in control and
possession of the elevator. "The crucial point is the actual control
of the elevator system, rather than the contractual agreement."29
26. Steele v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 335 So. 2d 586, 588 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976); Lauck
v. Publix Mkt., Inc., 335 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976). Compare Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v.
Clark, 299 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1st Dist.), cert. dismissed, 301 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1974).
27. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hughes Supply, Inc., 336 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1976).
28. Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Street, 327 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
29. Id. at 114.
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This case should be contrasted with Radar v. Otis Elevator Co.3" in
which a rider in an elevator sued the owner of the building in which
the elevator was located and the company (Otis) which maintained
the elevator. Before the trial, the building owner and the plaintiff
settled, and the owner then went to trial against Otis. Otis was
exonerated against the building owner and the plaintiff, then filed
suit against Otis. The trial court held that if Otis had no liability
toward the building owner, it had none against the plaintiff and
dismissed her suit. On appeal, it was held that the trial court was
in error because the alleged liability of Otis to the owner of the
building was not an essential part of the plaintiff's case against Otis.
Therefore, the decision in the prior case did not affect the plaintiff's
action against Otis.
E. Defenses to Products Liability
The manufacturer of a machine (a livestock drop feeder) in a
defective condition rendering it unreasonably dangerous to a user
may not be held liable to a user injured by the machine in either
breach of implied warranty of fitness or in negligence when the
defective condition was obviously dangerous to the user.3 This de-
fense holds true even though the defect could have been cured in the
design and manufacturing process by the expenditure of a nominal
sum of money.
A painter, who was injured by the inhalation of paint fumes,
was held to have no cause of action based on the theory that a
warning on the can of paint was inadequate where he had read the
warning label prior to using the paint. 2 The label had stated that
the user should avoid breathing the vapor or spray mist, avoid pro-
longed paint contact with the skin, and use the paint only with
adequate ventilation. As an additional factor the painter was in-
jured while wearing a mask.
A manufacturer of goods cannot be held liable either for negli-
gence or for breach of warranty unless there was a defect in the
product. Thus, when a golfer sued the manufacturer and servicer of
a golf cart because it rolled backwards upon him after he set the
brake, and the sole testimony in his favor demonstrated that the
30. 327 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
31. Farmhand, Inc. v. Brandies, 327 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
32. Wickham v. Baltimore Copper Paint Co., 327 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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brake released only once in several tests and then only when it was
depressed one third of the way, the golfer was unable to show any
defect in the cart.3
Section 371.60 of the Florida Statutes (1975) requires that a
plate be attached to boats stating the recommended number of
persons or the maximum weight load for safe operation. A violation
of this statute may constitute negligence per se. If the operator of a
boat were told that it was overloaded, however, and in spite of this
warning and apparent bad weather, the operator still increased the
speed of the boat after water came in over the bow, the cause of the
operator's drowning would not be attributed to the absence of the
plate but to the operator's negligence."
A supplier's bid forms which provide that the supplier will not
be liable for delay in furnishing structural steel to a building site
and that "acceptance of materials on delivery shall constitute a
waiver of any claims for damages on account of delay" precludes
liability for delayed delivery, but not for damages for defective and
non-conforming goods."
A contract for the supplying of fabricated pipe which provided
that the buyer was to make an inspection of the pipe within thirty
days after delivery and that the seller agreed to repair or replace
defective pipe provided claim was made within one year, has been
construed to mean that if the inspection were not made within the
thirty-day period, the buyer could not reject the pipe under UCC
section 2-606 3 or, under UCC section 2-608,11 revoke his accept-
ance.3 On the other hand, under UCC section 2-607 3 the buyer is
required to notify the seller within a reasonable time of a breach or
he will be barred from any remedy. Since the contract in question
had a one year warranty period, this was a determination by the
parties as to the reasonable length of time for the buyer to notify
the seller of the breach under UCC section 1-204.11 Thus, the buyer
33. Lash v. Noland, 321 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975), cert. denied, 333 So. 2d 463
(Fla. 1976).
34. Duncan v. Monark Boat Co., 330 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
35. Southeastern Builders, Inc. v. Joe Brashears Steel, Inc., 336 So. 2d 1228, 1229 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1976).
36. FLA. STAT. § 672.606 (1975).
37. FLA. STAT. § 672.608 (1975).
38. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. North Am. Steel Corp., 335 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1976).
39. FLA. STAT. § 672.607 (1975).
40. FLA. STAT. § 671.204 (1975).
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could recover for any breach since he did notify the seller within the
specified period.
F. Statute of Limitations
When a guest in a restaurant is hit on the head by a chandelier,
the statute of limitations for actions based on negligence and im-
plied warranty counts (assuming that he has a cause of action in
warranty) against the general contractor who constructed the res-
taurant begins to run from the date of the injury and not from the
completion of work by the contrctor. Further, under the 1973 version
of the Florida statute of limitations, the limitation would be under
the four-year period provided by former Florida Statutes section
95.11(4)(1973) for a tort action rather than section 95.11(5)(e) for a
breach of contract action."
In another case of first impression in Florida, the District Court
of Appeal for the Third District held that a cause of action for
wrongful death accrued under former Florida Statutes section
95.11(6)(1973)42 upon the death of the victim in an aircraft crash
rather than upon the date when it was discovered that his death was
allegedly caused by a design error in the manufacture of the air-
craft. 3
In an extraordinary opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida has
held that "[alssuming only for the purpose of this opinion that an
implied warranty was associated with the washing machine manu-
factured by petitioner in Sweden,"" the cause of action for the
breach of warranty arose at the time tender of delivery was made
in accordance with former section 672.725(2) of the Florida Statutes
(1973) (UCC section 2-725(2))" and not at the time when the breach
41. Smith v. Continental Ins. Co., 326 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976). 1974 Fla. Laws
ch. 74-382 § 7 substantially rewrote section 95.11; the current version now provides a four year
limit for actions based on breach of contract.
42. The current version, FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(d) (1975) provides the same two year limit
for wrongful death.
43. Walker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 320 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975). This case was
also decided under the former version of the statute of limitations.
44. AB CTC v. Morejon, 324 So. 2d 625, 628 (Fla. 1975). This decision's effect on the
statute of limitations is unclear in view of the overriding jurisdictional issues which were the
basis of the appeal.
45. Law of June 3, 1965, ch. 65-254 § 1, Fla. Laws 684 (repealed 1974). This act which
extended the statute of limitations to four years for breach of contract was repealed by section
26 of the act which extended the general contract limitation to four years.
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of warranty was discovered, as had been held in a prior case."5
A contract for compiling, editing, and publishing of pamphlets
has been construed to refer to a sale of goods, and hence subject to
the four-year statute of limitations rather than the three-year stat-
ute governing oral contracts."
G. Indemnity Agreements
The use of indemnity agreements in products liability cases was
well illustrated in Joseph L. Rozier Machinery Co. v. Nilo Barge
Line, Inc.'S An employee of Nilo Barge Line was instructed to rent
a portable generator from Rozier and to attach it to a truck and
bring it back to Nilo. The employee signed a lease form which con-
tained the following indemnity provision:
INDEMNITY - NON-VEHICLE - Customer shall defend,
indemnify and hold forever harmless Lessor, its subsidiary and
affiliated companies, their officers, agents and employees,
against all loss, liability and expense, including reasonable attor-
neys' fees, by reason of bodily injury including death, and prop-
erty damage, sustained by any person or persons including but
not limited to employees of Customer, as a result of the mainte-
nance, use, operation, storage, erection, dismantling, servicing or
transportation of Equipment other than Vehicles, whether such
bodily injury, death, or property damage are due or claimed to
be due to any negligence of Lessor, employees or agents of Lessor
or any other person.'
As the employee was driving the truck, a wheel fell from the genera-
tor, seriously injuring him. The employee sued the lessor of the
generator claiming negligent maintenance, and the lessor filed a
third-party action against the lessee for indemnity. The court held
46. Creviston v. General Motors Corp., 225 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1969); see Golconda Corp.
v. Newton, 336 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976), which deals with the statute of limitations
and the question of its applicability to a successor corporation to the one which manufactured
an allegedly defective product. The exact holding is difficult to ascertain.
47. Lake Wales Publishing Co., v. Florida Visitor, Inc., 335 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1976), applying section 672.2-725 of the FLA. STAT. (1975) which was transferred (in effect) to
section 95.11(3)(k) (1975).
48. 318 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975), cert. denied, 328 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1976). There
was no contention rasied in the case that the employee was not authorized to sign the lease
agreement on behalf of his employer.
49. Id. at 557-58. See also Murray, Indemnifying Suppliers Against Their Own Wrongs
- Risk Allocation of Products Liability, 9 UNIF. CoM. CoDE L.J. 203 (1977).
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that it was clear that the lessee was to indemnify the lessor against
"any negligence" of the lessor, and this would include any negli-
gence of the lessor prior to the execution of the lease. Under this type
of indemnity agreement, the employer's exposure for liability to his
employee will extend far beyond the limits of workmen's compensa-
tion.
Under the general rule of indemnification, in order for a con-
tract to be construed as requiring indemnification, it should clearly
and expressly provide for indemnification of the indemnitee for inju-
ries arising from the indemnitee's own negligence.5"
H. Revocation of Acceptance
UCC section 2-608 provides that a buyer may revoke his accept-
ance of goods "whose nonconformity substantially impairs its value
to him if he has accepted it."51 This substantial impairment must
be subjectively measured from the viewpoint of the buyer; however,
it is reversible error for a trial court to use the test of the financial
ability of the buyer to remedy the nonconformity as the standard
for substantial impairment. 2
In an apparent case of first impression in Florida, the Court of
Appeal for the First District held that a complaint which incorpo-
rated by reference an attached letter that revoked the plaintiff's
acceptance because of defects in the car purchased from the defen-
dant stated a cause of action, even though the complaint itself did
not state the facts alleged in the letter of revocation.53
I. Performance of Warranties
Sections 320.696 and 320.697 of the Florida Statutes (1975) pro-
vide that a motor vehicle licensee (such as a distributor) shall com-
pensate any authorized motor vehicle dealer who performs work to
rectify the licensee's products or warranty defects. These provisions
have been interpreted to mean that when a consumer sues an au-
thorized car dealer who has refused to repair defects arising out of
a breach of implied warranty "also termed as 'advertised war-
50. United Gas Pipeline Co. v. Gulf Power Co., 334 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
51. FLA. STAT. § 672.608 (1975).
52. Barrington Homes, Inc. v. Kelley, 320 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
53. McClurkin v. Parrish Volvo, Inc., 317 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
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ranty ' ''5' and also sues the licensee under the statute, the consumer
cannot recover from the licensee because it was the legislative intent
to cover only written warranties and not those "judicially in-
spired."55 The court overlooked, unfortunately, the fact that the
UCC has legislatively created warranties of merchantibility and fit-
ness for a particular purpose."
J. Collateral Source Rule
The collateral source rule received an unusual application in
Walker v. Hilliard.57 The buyer of a farm tractor incurred flood
damage to the tractor. The buyer's insurance company paid for the
damage, and he returned the tractor to the seller for repair. While
it was in the hands of the seller, it was discovered that the tractor
was a stolen tractor, and the true owner claimed it. The buyer sued
the seller for breach of warranty of title. The appellate court held
that the seller was liable for full damages, undiminished by the
amount paid to the buyer by his insurance company. "If there must
be a windfall, it is more just that the injured party profit, rather
than the wrongdoer be relieved of full responsibility for his wrongdo-
ing."s
5
K. Damages for Breach
A court, in awarding damages for lost profits, including over-
head, to a seller when the buyer breaches under UCC section 2-708,19
must be careful to avoid including more than one award for over-
head."
L. Insurance Proceeds
A wholesale seller of jewelry on consignment to a retail jeweler
has the right to intervene in the retailer's suit against its fire insur-
ance company for loss which ocurred in a fire in order to claim any
of the proceeds which might be owing to the intervenor."
54. Jagodnik v. Renault, Inc., 328 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
55. Id. at 213.
56. FLA. STAT. §§ 672.314-15 (1975).
57. 329 So. 2d 44 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
58. Id. at 45.
59. FLA. STAT. § 672.708 (1975).
60. See Tech Corp. v. Permutit Co., 321 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
61. W. Klang & Son, Inc. v. Milar Galleries, Inc., 328 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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M. Title to Goods
A used car dealer who sells an encumbered automobile without
the consent of the security interest holder and who fails to deliver a
certificate of title to the buyer of the car, may be held liable under
section 818.01 of the Florida Statutes (1975) for the criminal offense
of selling personal property under a lien and for the criminal offense
of transferring a motor vehicle without delivery of a certificate of
title.2 Absence of any proof that he had the criminal intent to com-
mit these offenses was not a defense. This approach may be one way
to help curb the habit of some used car dealers of selling "out of
trust."I3
N. Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Law
The Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (known
as the little FTC Act)" which prohibits the use of unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce has been
upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court of Florida." The Act
does not define what is an "unfair trade practice," and it was con-
tended that those words were so vague and indefinite that they
denied substantive due process. The court rejected this facet of the
attack on the grounds that these phrases were also found in the
Federal Trade Commission Act and in the Model Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Act, and that thirty years of
case law had given these words a meaning well settled in trade
regulation law. The Act was further attacked on the grounds that
there was an unconstitutional delegation of rulemaking authority to
the Department of Legal Affairs (the executive branch) which was
to be exercised in accordance with the rules, regulations, and deci-
sions of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts in
interpreting the Federal Trade Commission Act. The court, after
concluding that there was a delegation of authority, upheld it as
being within constitutional limits. Finally, the Act provides that
"due consideration and great weight shall be given to the interpreta-
tions of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts relat-
62. FLA. STAT. § 319.34 (1975).
63. See Helmig v. State, 330 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
64. F'LA. STAT. §§ 501.201-213 (1975).
65. Department of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1976). This case upheld
the 1973 version of the act which is essentially identical to its 1975 counterpart.
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ing to ... the Federal Trade Commission Act... as from time to
time amended."6 It would appear that the legislature was attempt-
ing to delegate authority to the Commission, the federal courts and
the Congress of the United States in the future, which would be
impermissible. The Supreme Court of Florida, however, neatly side-
stepped the issue by stating: "To preserve the constitutional valid-
ity of the act, we would like to say that the legislative enactment
intended only decisions made prior to its enactment." 7
III. BULK SALES
In a case of apparent first impression in the United States, it
was held that a secured creditor had standing to attack a bulk sale
of a business conducted in violation of the bulk sale provisions (Arti-
cle 6) of the UCC.15 The secured creditor was not given notice of the
sale, although the seller and buyers of the business knew of the
secured party's security interest in a major item of the business's
equipment. The secured party repossessed the equipment upon de-
fault by the buyer and claimed a deficiency amount from the buy-
ers. The lower court ruled in favor of the buyers. The appellate court
reversed, stating that the secured creditor would be able to recover
the deficiency from the buyers because of the failure to comply with
the notification requirements of Article 6.
IV. WAREHOUSING AND TRANSPORTATION Op GOODS
A district court has held that the enforceability of a limitation
of liability provision is dependent on the shipper's knowledge of the
existence of that provision in the bill of lading." The shipper admit-
ted at trial that she understood that she was signing a contract when
she signed the bill, but asserted that she knew nothing of the limita-
tion provision. The goods were subsequently lost while in the car-
rier's possession. This case was incorrectly decided since the limita-
tion of liability clause (if it correctly follows the approved tariff)
should have been binding on the shipper regardless of her state of
knowledge. 7"
66. FLA. STAT. § 501.204(2) (1975) (emphasis added).
67. 329 So. 2d at 267.
68. Automated Truck & Trailer Wash Ctrs., Inc. v. Eastamp, Inc., 320 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2d
Dist. 1975). See FLA. STAT. §§ 676.101-10 (1975).
69. Allied Van Lines, Inc. v. Bratton, 330 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
70. J. MILLER, LAW OF FREIGHT Loss AND DAMAGE CLAIMS 350-62 (3d ed. 1967).
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Testimony by a plaintiff owner of household goods, destroyed
in a warehouse fire, that the goods were worth more at the time of
their loss than at their purchase twenty years before, was "not com-
petent, substantial evidence which accords with logic and reason."'
The proper test of damages should have been market value at the
date of the loss.
A recent case illustrates the difficulties of proving at which
point a loss of goods in transit occurred when the goods were han-
dled by more than one carrier. A consignor-consignee delivered
goods to a shipline in the far east, and bills of lading (and other
shipping documents) were delivered to the consignor-consignee. The
shipment arrived at a port and was unloaded by a stevedoring com-
pany. The goods were then placed in the hands of a land carrier
which delivered only a portion of the goods to the consignor-
cosignee. The consignor-consignee sued the shipline, and the trial
court entered judgment against the shipline. On appeal, the deci-
sion was reversed on the ground that the consignor-consignee did
not prove that the goods were lost by theft while in the hands of the
shipline. Furthermore, the court held that the consignor-consignee
might hold all carriers liable for the loss, and the land carrier as the
last carrier would then be liable unless it could show that it received
the goods in a pilfered or damaged state.7"
V. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
A. Jurisdiction
Service of process under section 48.193(1)(g) of the Florida
Statutes (1975) may be effectuated against a nonresident who pre-
viously indorsed a corporate note (as a guarantor) and executed a
separate guaranty agreement in the State of Florida, when he fails
to pay the note in accordance with the terms of his guaranty.73
B. Venue
In accordance with section 47.061 of the Florida Statutes,
(1975) a suit on an unsecured promissory note shall be brought in
the county in which the note was signed by the maker or in which
71. Allied Van Lines, Inc. v. McKnab, 331 So. 2d 319-20 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
72. Swedish East Asia Co. v. Topp Electronics, Inc., 334 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
73. Feldman v. Southeast Bank of Dadeland, 323 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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the maker resides, but not in the county in which payment was to
be made.74 Section 47.061 has no application to a suit filed against
a maker who resides in a foreign state and who signed the notes in
the foreign state. As a result, if notes were payable in Escambia
County, Florida, and the foreign maker was authorized to do busi-
ness in said county, then venue would be proper in Escambia
County." The proper venue for suit against the drawer of a disho-
nored check is the county in which the drawee bank is located and
not the county in which a depository bank of the payee is located."
This view is based on the theory that the contract of the drawer is
to be performed in the drawee bank, and the cause of action arises
there upon dishonor.
When a promissory note was executed and delivered to the
payee in Dade County, Florida, and the note provided for payment
by the makers or guarantors to be made in Dade County, an action
based on a default in payment on the note could not be transferred
to Broward County, Florida, over the protests of the plaintiff-
payee." The obligors had sought the transferral based on the filing
of a separate suit in Broward County which involved different par-
ties though the same issues.
C. The Partial Demise of the Holder in Due Course
The Federal Trade Commission has promulgated a rule which
requires any purchase-money lender, vendor, or lessor to include the
following legend in ten point boldface type in any consumer credit
contract:
ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT
IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH
THE DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF
GOODS OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO
74. Foster v. Greco, 320 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975). But see Atwood v. Florida Equity
& Mortgage Investors, 325 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975), where the same court held in an
overly terse opinion that venue for suit is proper in the county in which payment is to be made
to the plaintiff-payee rather than in the county of the debtor. The second case, if it deals with
an unsecured promissory note, is wrong in light of section 47.061.
75. Cousins Mortgage & Equity Inv. v. Florida First Nat'l. Bank, 324 So. 2d 139 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1975).
76. Shindler v. State Wide Recovery & Research Corp., 330 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 3d Dist.
1976).




OR WITH THE PROCEEDS HEREOF; RECOVERY HERE-
UNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED
AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER.78
This legend will, of course, destroy the negotiability of any con-
sumer credit contract which contains the usual negotiable promis-
sory note. 9 Furthermore, this legend will also destroy the waiver of
defenses rule contained in UCC section 9-206. 81 It is still too early
to determine this ruling's impact on consumer credit regarding lim-
iting its availability, restraining improper credit practices on the
part of ghetto merchants, or changing current interest rates etc.
The decision in Dynamic Homes, Inc. v. Rogers,"' is illustrative
of the uncanny luck of Florida appellate courts to arrive at the right
result for the wrong reasons. A promissory note was signed:"
by /s/ Arthur J. Maas ..................... (SEAL)
by /s/Janet H. Maas ..................... (SEAL)
Is/ Arthur J. M aas ........................ (SEAL)
ARTHUR MASS-Individually
Is! Janet H. M aas ........................ (SEAL)
JANET MAAS-Individually
The note did not contain the name of any corporation, but the
payees sued Dynamic Homes, Inc. the alleged corporate principal.
The district court of appeal cited UCC section 3-403 (and the com-
ments thereto)" for the proposition that parol testimony could be
introduced between the immediate parties to show that Arthur J.
Maas and Janet H. Maas signed in a representative capacity, but
held that the testimony introduced at the trial did not show that
they did sign in such a capacity. Although this view is correct, it is
irrelevant to the question of the liability of the unnamed corporation
because UCC section 3-403 states that "no person is liable on an
instrument unless his signature appears thereon." Even if parol
testimony had shown that the signers were signing in behalf of the
unnamed corporation, the corporation would not have been liable.
The parol testimony would have released the individual signers
from liability with the result that no one would have been liable on
78. 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1976).
79. FLA. STAT. §§ 673.104(I)(h), 673.105 (1975) (UCC §§ 3-104(i)(b), 3-105).
80. FLA. STAT. § 679.206 (1975).
81. 331 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
82. Id. at 327.
83. FLA. STAT. § 673.403 (1975).
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the note. Apparently, the court was confused as to the use of parol
testimony.
Although UCC section 3-403(2) permits the introduction of
parol evidence between the immediate parties to a negotiable in-
strument to show that an agent signed in his representative capacity
(rather than personally), this same rule does not hold true when a
corporate president signs, as the corporate president, a guaranty of
a lease executed by his corporation as lessee. As a result, parol
testimony may not be introduced to prevent his personal liability
as a guarantor. 4
D. Accord and Satisfaction
An unusual aspect of an accord and satisfaction agreement was
present in Sound City, Inc. v. Kessler.5 In settlement of a disputed
account, a debtor gave his check to the creditor. The check stated
on its reverse side:
This check is accepted in full settlement of transactions repre-
sented by invoices listed in other side. By endorsing this check
and obtaining payment hereof, the endorsers agree that they will
not in the future refuse to sell deal with [sic] Sound City Inc.
on a COD basis (this agreement requires the extension of no
credit whatsoever). It is agreed by the parties hereto that this
agreement shall be specifically enforceable [sic]; & if it is vio-
lated by any endorser that endorser agrees to pay damages and
reasonable attorney's fee to enforce this agreement. The parties
to this agreement are Sound City Inc and the undersigned endor-
sers.86
The endorsers of the check stopped selling records to the drawer of
the check who then brought suit for specific performance. The en-
dorsers defended on the ground that the contract did not have a
termination date and was, therefore, not specifically enforceable. It
was held, however, that when a contract fails to provide for an
expiration date, the duration of the contract is to be determined
from the surrounding circumstances. If the parties did not contem-
plate a termination date or if their intention cannot be ascertained,
84. Manufacturers' Leasing, Ltd. v. Florida Dev. & Attractions, Inc., 330 So. 2d 171 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1976).
85. 316 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
86. Id. at 316.
[Vol. 31:895
COMMERCIAL LAW
"the contract will be terminable within a reasonable time depend-
ing upon the circumstances and . . . it may not be terminated by
either party without first giving reasonable notice."87
E. Summary Judgment
It is reversible error to enter a summary judgment in favor of
an alleged holder in due course when the maker has raised in his
answer allegations that the note was obtained by fraud of the payee,
that there was a lack of consideration for the note, that the note was
issued subject to a condition which the holder knew about, and that
the holder took the demand note an unreasonable length of time
(three months) after its issuance.88
F. Parol Evidence
The District Court of Appeal for the Fourth District has held
that parol evidence may be introduced to show that it was the
understanding of the makers and payee of a promissory note that
the individual liability of the makers would be released upon the
incorporation of a corporation whose name appeared on the note as
a maker. It is submitted that the court confused the rule allowing
parol evidence to show a condition precedent to liability, with the
rule forbidding parol evidence to show a condition subsequent."
G. Discharge
When an unsecured creditor sues a debtor, the debtor may
normally introduce an order of discharge in bankruptcy as prima
facie proof of the discharge of the claim. If the bankruptcy, however,
were a chapter XI proceeding, a discharge may be effectuated only
upon the debt being part of the arrangement which was confirmed
by the bankruptcy court. Thus, proof of both the arrangement and
confirmation must be introduced in the state court in order to defeat
the claim."'
87. Id. at 318. See also FLA. STAT. § 672.309 (1975).
88. A.B.G. Inv., Inc. v. Seldon, 336 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
89. Menke v. Cournoyer, 330 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
90. W. E. BRrrrON, BILLS AND NoTs §§ 54-55 (2d ed. 1961).
91. Wellington-Hall, Ltd. v. Comprehensive Communities Corp., 321 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1975).
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H. Contribution
Under former section 733.703 of the Florida Statutes (1975), one
court held that if a husband were to die, the wife could bring a
declaratory judgment action against his estate to determine her
rights of contribution from the estate. The widow would have to
have filed her claim under the former non-claim statute within four
months from the time of the first publication of the notice to credi-
tors or would be barred from any relief if she were subsequently
forced to pay the entire amount of the note to the payee." The fact
that the widow had not made any of the payments was held to be
irrelevant because the non-claim statute required the filing of all
claims "whether due or not, direct or contingent."93 Inasmuch as
this statute has been repealed, it is not clear what the widow would
have to do to preserve her rights under the new probate code.
I. Restrictive Indorsements
A clever embezzlement scheme and UCC section 3-41911 came
into play in Siegel Trading Co., Inc. v. Coral Ridge National Bank. 5
Seigel Trading opened an account in the defendant bank in the
name of "The Siegel Trading Company, Inc., Customers' Segre-
gated Account""0 for the deposit of customer's margin funds. The
manager of Siegel's Fort Lauderdale, Florida office subsequently
opened an account with the defendant bank in the name of
"Samstein, Inc., d/b/a/ Siegel Trading Co. of Fort Lauderdale." '7
The manager then deposited a number of checks belonging to the
plaintiff in this account. The checks were collected by the defen-
dant, and the manager withdrew the funds. The plaintiff sued for
the conversion of its checks, and the appellate court held that the
defendant bank could not be held innocent of conversion in the
absence of findings of fact that it operated "in accordance with the
reasonable commercial standards applicable to the business of
such" bank (under UCC section 3-419(3)11) in its handling of the
92. Simpson v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 318 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
93. FLA. STAT. § 733.702(1) (1975).
94. FLA. STAT. § 673.719 (1975).
95. 328 So. 2d 476, 477 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
96. Id. at 477.
97. Id.
98. FLA. STAT. § 673.419(3) (1975).
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checks. The trial court had held that the bank did not fail to comply
reasonably with its own commercial standards, but, as the appellate
court noted, a bank must operate in good faith and in accordance
with the reasonable commercial standards applicable to the bank-
ing business.
J. Massachussetts Business Trusts
The trustees of a Massachussetts business trust which is the
holder of a promissory note and mortgage have standing to maintain
a foreclosure action in the trusts' behalf." Furthermore, a Massa-
chusetts business trust which has fully complied with chapter 609
of the Florida Statutes (1975) (empowering it to do business in
Florida) has the power to foreclose mortgages in this state without
its trustees being plaintiffs in the action.'"1
K. Usury
An attorney who lent $25,000 for a period of thirty days under
an agreement which he drafted, providing that the borrowers were
to pay the loan along with a gold doubloon worth not less than
$1,000, knew or should have known that the transaction was usu-
rious on its face because it provided for interest of 48 percent per
annum. 10 Thus he was denied recovery of the principal sum even
though the gold doubloon was allegedly a fake.
The parties to a loan agreement which is usurious may abandon
it and substitute another loan agreement which is not usurious, and
the borrower will then be deemed to have waived his claim to usury
under the original agreement. 02
L. Title
An unusual defense to a suit on a promissory note was pre-
sented in a recent case. 13 The maker of a promissory note borrowed
99. Brickell Constr. Co. v. Pujol, 329 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976). In regard to Massa-
chusetts business trusts, see Your Constr. Center, Inc. v. Gross, 316 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1975); Boyd v. Boulevard Nat'l Bank, 306 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
100. Tampa Properties, Inc. v. Great Am. Mortgage Inv., 333 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1976).
101. Atwood v. Fisher, 330 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976). For an analysis of a note
regarding the issue of usury, see Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Penland, 335 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1976).
102. Munilla v. Perez-Cobo, 335 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
103. Smith v. Ocean State Bank, 335 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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money from a bank and attempted to use the proceeds of the loan
to purchase silver from a company. The purchase did not involve
the bank. Subsequently, an officer of the bank allegedly telephoned
the seller of the silver and on two occasions stated that the
purchaser-borrower had no right to use the loan to purchase silver
and that the bank was entitled to any proceeds which resulted from
the purchase. These alleged statements were untrue, and the seller
of the silver refused to complete the transaction causing damage to
the purehager. The payee.bank sued the maker who counterclaimed
for intentional and unjustified interference with a business relation-
ship. The trial court dismissed the counterclaim, but the appellate
court reversed holding that the counterclaim was sufficient to show
the existence of a business relationship (though not necessarily evi-
denced by an enforceable contract), knowledge of the relationship
by the bank's officer, an intentional and unjustified interference
with this relationship, and damages resulting to the borrower as a
result of the breach of the relationship.
In a case of first impression in Florida, it was held that under
section 440.22 of the Florida Statutes (1975) an employer's estate
may not offset any workmen's compensation benefits owed to a
deceased employee's estate because of a promissory note signed by
the deceased workman and his wife where the employer was the
obligee under the note." 4
M. Attorney's Fees
In an overly succinct opinion, it has been held that when a
surety company has issued its bond to secure payment of a promi-
sory note and the company brings a declaratory decree action to
determine its liabilities under the bond, it is error to award attor-
ney's fees on the bond when the bond does not provide for them,
even though the promissory note does provide for attorney's fees. 105
The force of the opinion is attenuated by the fact that the surety
company dismissed its case prior to any final determination of its
liabilities.
104. Kennedy v. Estate of Beasley, 318 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).





Even though personal services of process upon nonresident
mortgagors may be available under section 48.193 of the Florida
Statutes (1975), a foreclosing mortgagee may elect to use service of
process by publication under section 49.021 of the Florida Statutes
(1975). In this latter event, the plaintiff will, of course, not be enti-
tled to an in personam judgment against the mortgagors for any
deficiency between the unpaid balance of the mortgage and the
sales price at foreclosure.'"'
B. Construction Loans
A contractor who has completed the construction of a building
is entitled to an equitable lien against the undisbursed balance of
construction loan funds under a construction loan agreement. A
contractor (or other lienor) is not entitled to this equitable lien,
however, when the work has not been completed because of the
default of the owner and the construction lender has not misled the
contractor (or other subcontractor or supplier) into continuing to
work or supply materials after the owner has defaulted. 1"7
A general contractor who completes the construction of a hotel
is entitled to an equitable lien on undisbursed construction loan
funds which the construction mortgagee lender refuses to disburse
because the owner of the hotel defaulted on the mortgage by never
applying for a permanent construction mortgage.'"8 The foreclosure
of the construction loan by the mortgagee was held by the trial court
as superior to the contractor's mechanic's lien on the real property.
Consequently, the court imposed the lien even though there was a
"kickback" which the contractor gave to the owner, since, as the
court noted, no prejudice inured to the construction lender as a
result of this "kickback" and most of the "kickback" was actually
used in the construction project and thus returned to the property.
A foreclosure judgment must not be based upon the face
amount of a note and mortgage when the facts show that the mort-
106. Risman v. Whittaker, 336 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
107. J.G. Plumbing Ser., Inc. v. Coastal Mortgage Co., 329 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1976).
108. Morgen-Oswood & Assoc., Inc. v. Continental Mortgage Inv., 323 So. 2d 684 (Fla.
4th Dist. 1976).
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gagee as the lender under the construction loan has not in fact
advanced the full face amount of the note and mortgage.0 9
A loan application wherein the lender reserves the right prior
to final disbursement to withdraw its approval of the loan for any
reason prevents the application from being a binding contract.
When the lender accepts a signed note and mortgage, however, the
prior loan application "contract" is merged into the note and mort-
gage, and it becomes binding upon the lender. If the lender should
still refuse to make the loan, the damages consist of the additional
cost of the substitute loan reduced to its present value."0
In the absence of any contrary clause in a construction loan
agreement, the mortgagors may not introduce parol testimony to
the effect that the mortgagee was to make inspections as work prog-
ressed to assure that the house would be constructed in a workman-
like manner as a defense to a mortgage foreclosure action."'
C. Balloon Mortgages
In an apparent case of first impression, it has been held that
section 697.05 of the Florida Statutes (1975), which regulates
"balloon mortgages," has no application to a promissory note (and
mortgage) which provides for an initial payment and a final pay-
ment."2 The statute was held designed to cover balloon mortgages
for regular monthly or regular periodic payments and not one which
merely has two payments, even if its final payment were over twice
as large as the first.
D. Instruments Treated as Mortgages
In another apparent case of first impression in Florida, a dis-
trict court has decided that a vendee in possession under a recorded
agreement for deed after he has defaulted, but before he has given
up possession of the land, has an equity of redemption which is
subject to levy by his judgment lien creditors."' The court reasoned
that the agreement for deed must be treated as if it were a mortgage.
109. Henmerle v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. 338 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
110. Financial Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Contintental Enterprises, Inc., 338 So. 2d 907
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
111. O'Neal v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 328 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
112. Vlock v. Capodilupo, 327 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
113. Hoffman v. Semet, 316 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
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Further, if a lien creditor should purchase the vendee's interest at
the sheriffs sale he would have the right to satisfy the total out-
standing indebtedness to the vendor and to receive a deed for the
property. Moreover, the lien creditor-purchaser might also bring
suit for specific performance against the vendor to secure a deed.
E. Priorities
A mortgage which is filed prior to the filing of a mechanic's lien
will have priority over it. If the amount of the mortgage is increased
(by a modification agreement) after the filing of the mechanic's lien,
however, then the amount of the increase will be subservient to the
mechanic's lien."4 The mortgagee then will have first priority for the
original amount and third priority for the increased amount.
When a mortgage recites that it encumbers "all the land lo-
cated in the County of Orange, State of Florida ...described in
Exhibit 'A' attached hereto and made a part hereof,""' 5 but Exhibit
"A" is not attached, recording of the mortgage is constructive notice
to no one. If a notice of commencement were filed on the same day
as this void mortgage, any mechanic's liens which were subse-
quently filed would relate back to the date of filing of the notice of
commencement. Therefore, if this mortgage were re-recorded along
with the omitted Exhibit "A," the lien claimants would have prior-
ity over the mortgagee whose original filing was defective.
A purchase money first mortgage which is properly recorded
prior to a judgmerit lien being entered against the mortgagor has
priority over the judgment lien. Thus, if the lien creditor attempts
to levy his lien upon the property after a lis pendens has been filed
in the mortgage foreclosure action, it arises too late, and the foreclo-
sure of the mortgage extinguishes the lien creditor's interest."6
A mortgagee under a purchase money mortgage has priority
over a prior judgment lien entered against the mortgagor." 7
, F. Equitable Liens
Although a mortgage given by a mortgagor who did not own the
land is invalid, an equitable lien may be imposed when the mortga-
114. Bowen v. American Arlington Bank, 325 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
115. Air Flow Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Baker, 326 So. 2d 449, 450 (Fla. 4th
Dist. 1976).
116. Baron v. Aiello, 319 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
117. Associates Discount Corp. v. Gomes, 338 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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gee's funds were used to improve the property with the knowledge
and consent of the real owner of the property."'
When a warranty deed to land is obtained by the fraud of the
grantee in misrepresenting the nature of the instrument to the gran-
tor, the deed is void."' If the fraudulent grantee then mortgages the
property, the mortgage is also void. Although the mortgage is void,
if the mortgagee advances funds to pay other liens and encumbr-
ances on the property, he is entitled to reimbursement from the
defrauded true owner of the property.
G. Moratorium Clauses
A mortgage clause has been judicially upheld where the clause
provided that if a building moratorium were imposed by govern-
mental authority or if water and sewerage were unavailable, a mora-
torium would result as to payment of principal and interest during
said period. 20 The moratorium was invoked by the Dade County
Director of Pollution Control prohibiting sewerage hookups on the
subject property. It is suggested that in light of ever increasing
environmental controls, this use of similar (or expanded) morato-
rium clauses will increase. Judge Barkdull, in specially concurring
with the result, suggested that if the sewerage moratorium might be
of sufficient duration so as to make this mortgage clause oppressive
or unconscionable, it might justify a court in relieving parties from
the agreement.'
H. Insurance Proceeds
When mortgaged insured real estate has been destroyed by fire
and the mortgagee sues the insurer, the rights of the mortgagee
under a loss-payable clause in the insurance policy are determined
based on the amount owing on the mortgage at the time of the fire
and not at the time of the trial.'22
118. Wagner v. Roberts, 320 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
119. Houston v. Mentelos, 318 So. 2d 427 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
120. Kessler v. Hilsenroth, 325 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
121. Id. at 74.





A trial court may be justified in refusing to allow the accelera-
tion of the total mortgage indebtedness and foreclosure of a mort-
gage on the grounds of unconscionablity, when the mortgagor has
made a technical default in one month's payment.' The default
was alleged to have occurred because of an excusable misunderstan-
ding by the serviceman-mortgagor (who was in the Phillipines) and
the Florida mortgagee and the communication difficulties between
the two countries.
Accelerating clauses in promissory notes are to be construed
strictly against the lender because of their harsh nature. When an
acceleration clause in a promissory note secured by a mortgage pro-
vides that the holders have the right to accelerate "in the event that
this property is sold by the maker(s)"'' and the makers have en-
tered into an agreement for deed with third parties, this does not
constitute a present sale of the property but merely a contract to
sell. As a result, the accelerating event has not occurred, and the
note and mortgage may not be accelerated. The validity of this kind
of acceleration clause has been implicitly upheld, however.
In another recent case,' a subordinated mortgage provided
that default in the first mortgage would "constitute an automatic
default in this [the subordinated] mortgage." A default occurred
in the first mortgage with the result that the mortgagee of the subor-
dinated mortgage declared a default in his mortgage, accelerated
the entire balance and filed suit for foreclosure. Although the first
mortgagee subsequently extended the time of payment on his mort-
gage, it was held that this act had no effect on the acceleration of
the subordinated mortgage foreclosure.
A mortgage note which contains clauses waiving demand for
payment and providing for acceleration of the entire balance in the
event of a default in the payment of any installment, may be accel-
erated upon the makers' failure to make an installment payment.,
In such a case the holder has no duty to seek the makers and give
them an opportunity to cure the default.
123. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Taylor, 318 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
124. Chopan v. Klinkman, 330 So. 2d 154, 155 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976); cf., Uwanawich v.
Gaudini, 334 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
125. Crescent Beach Co. v. Conzelnam, 321 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
126. Motel Mangagement Co. v. Winger, 335 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
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When a contract for deed (treated as a mortgage by the court)
provides that "failure to pay any installments herein promptly when
dueshall cause the entire indebtedness to become immediately due
and payable,"'' 7 the provision is to be deemed an automatic acceler-
ation clause (not an optional one). Hence, the failure to make a
payment results in the self-executing acceleration of the balance of
the indebtedness without any demand by the payee.
J. Foreclosure Defenses
When there is substantial evidence that a mortgagor (now de-
ceased) executed a note and mortgage on his property in order to
defeat a possible income tax lien against the property and the mort-
gagee gave no consideration for the mortgage, the heirs of the mort-
gagor may assert this lack of consideration in a mortgage foreclosure
suit. 8 The mortgagee, the deceased mortgagor, and the heirs of the
mortgagor are in pari delicto; however, since the mortgagee was
seeking the foreclosure of the mortgage, the court was correct in
refusing to assist him in the attempted foreclosure and eviction of
the heirs in possession.
An affirmative defense in a mortgage foreclosure action that the
mortgagee "had ample funds of the defendant's to apply to the
note"'25 does not meet the required degree of certainty so as to
inform the mortgagee of what is proposed to be proved in order that
it might have a fair opportunity to prepare its evidence. A trial court
would, therefore, be correct in ordering the defendant-mortgagor to
file an amended defense.
A mortgagor in a foreclosure action may introduce parol testi-
mony of an oral agreement which allegedly provided for the mortga-
gee to release mineral rights in the encumbered land upon certain
payments being made by the mortgagor, and which was entered into
simultaneously with the execution of the written mortgage, pro-
vided "that the oral agreement is shown by clear, precise and indub-
itable evidence."'' 30
127. Cook v. Merrifield, 335 So. 2d 297, 298 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
128. Chaykin v. Kant, 327 So. 2d 793 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
129. Zito v. Washington Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 318 So. 2d 175, 176 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
130. Furlong v. First Nat'l Bank, 329 So. 2d 406, 408 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976). A first mortga-
gee may be granted a summary judgment for foreclosure as against a second mortgagee who
has raised defenses when the court believes that the defenses are merely "paper issues" and
without substance in fact. Reflex, N.V. v. UMET Trust, 336 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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In order to prove usury it is necessary for the borrower to prove
that the lender knowingly and willfully charged and received an
unlawful rate of interest. A corrupt purpose by the lender must be
proved, and thus the lender may be permitted to testify that he did
not have this corrupt intent. 3' Hence, the entry of a summary judg-
ment in favor of a debtor in a usury case is improper when there
remain issues as to whether payments were in fact usurious and
whether the lender had the requisite corrupt intent to exact more
than the legal rate of interest. 3 '
A writ of certiorari was discharged in the case of Financial
Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Burleigh House, Inc., 33
leaving intact the district court's decision that a foreign savings and
loan association is not exempt from the Florida usury laws under
section 665.161 of the Florida Statutes (1967)1" as are domestic
savings and loan associations.
The mortgagor does not have a cause of action for reformation
of a mortgage where the mortgagee lowered a thirty day default
clause to fifteen days.' 35 The mortgagee had previously insisted in
good faith on the mortgagor's wife's signature on the purchase agree-
ment to which he had no right. When some doubt was cast on the
identity of the mortgagor's wife, the mortgagee dropped his demand
for her signature in return for the lowering of the default time limit.
The court held there was sufficient consideration for the modifica-
tion based on the mortgagee's forebearance to demand her signa-
ture. Since all prior agreements were merged into the new contract,
mortgage reformation could not be granted.
K. Procedure
In an apparent case of first impression, it has been held that a
final judgment of foreclosure of a mortgage is a final decision and
not an interlocutory one; thus any appeal from the judgment would
not be within rule 4.2 of the Florida Appellate Rules as an appeal
from an interlocutory order or judgment. 36
131. Sumner v. Inv. Mortgage Co., 332 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
132. I.R.E. Fin. Corp. v. Cassel, 335 So. 2d 598 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
133. 336 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1976), discharging cert. on, 305 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
134. The court cited the statute erroneously as it had been renumbered. FLA. STAT. §
665.395 (1975).
135. Uwanawich v. Gaudini, 334 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
136. Symon-Ryals Group, Inc. v. Citizens & Southern Mortgage Co., 334 So. 2d 144 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1976).
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In an emergency situation it is permissible for a court to ap-
point a receiver in mortgage foreclosure proceedings prior to service
of process upon the defendant.' 1 In addition, it is reversible error
for a trial court to dismiss the petition for an appointment of a
receiver in a mortgage foreclosure case when the mortgage provides
for the appointment, the mortgagee has established a prima facie
case, and the court has not received contrary evidence from the
mortgagor.'3
Under rule 1.440 of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure a case
is at issue thirty days after service of the last pleading. If one party
in a mortgage foreclosure action notices the other for a trial date
within the thirty day period, however, the receiving party may be
deemed to have waived this period when he is tardy in making his
objections.'3
A mortgage foreclosure sale conducted by the clerk of the court
may not be set aside on the ground that the clerk failed to delay the
sale beyond the notice hour until the imminent arrival of a prospec-
tive bidder invited by the mortgagor, in the absence of any proof
that the clerk agreed to delay the sale.'""
A final judgment of mortgage foreclosure which provided that
the clerk of the court was to sell the property "to the highest bidder
or bidders for cash"' 4 ' has been construed to mean that the clerk had
the discretion to accept one-third of the amount bid (apparently in
cash) to permit the bidder to pay the remaining two-thirds on the
following day and then to extend the time an additional day when
the bidder was caught in a traffic jam and could not reach the
courthouse before it closed on the day following the sale. The court
noted that there was no fraud or trickery involved, and the only
person who complained was the disappointed second highest bidder
who alleged that he was willing to pay the entire price on the day
of the sale.
The mortgagor in a foreclosure action does not have a constitu-
tional right of trial by jury in the determination of the amount of
the deficiency which has resulted from the foreclosure sale of the
encumbered property.' On the other hand, a deficiency judgment
137. Overseas Dev., Inc. v. Krause, 323 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
138. Howley v. Sage Shopping Plaza Corp., 336 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
139. Davis v. Hagin, 330 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
140. Jonton, Inc. v. Fidelity Mortgage Investors, 329 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
141. Smith v. First Nat'l Bank, 336 So. 2d 448, 449 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
142. Bradberry v. Atlantic Bank, 336 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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in a mortgage foreclosure action may be denied when the court finds
that the value of the property bid in by the mortgagee greatly ex-
ceeds the amount owing on the mortgage as established by the fore-
closure judgment. Further, if there were no deficiency judgment,
then unconditional guarantors would not be liable on their guaranty
to the mortgagee. 143
L. Miscellaneous
If a mortgage is assigned by the mortgagee for a loan to the
mortgagee and the loan agreement provides that if the mortgagee
fails to pay principal and interest by a certain date, the assignee-
lendor may exercise a remedy of foreclosure of the mortgage, the
assignee was given all of the rights of ownership when the mortgagee
defaulted in making its payments."'
A final judgment which finds that the mortgagee is the owner
and holder of a note and that the mortgage is binding on the mortga-
gor, may not be defeated by the mortgagor's assertion that third
persons (not parties to the suit) have some interest in the note and
mortgage.' The right of third parties to the note and mortgage
should be tried in an action between them and the mortgagee.
A lawyer who was simultaneously acting as agent and officer of
a bank and as an issuing agent for a title insurance company issued
a title insurance policy insuring the bank as the mortgagee of a loan
issued by it, knowing (because of his own dishonest conduct) that
the mortgage was not a first lien.' The bank was held able to
recover on the policy over the contention that the lawyer's knowl-
edge should be imputed to the bank. The court reasoned that be-
cause the agent was acting adversely to his principal, the bank, his
knowledge could not be imputed to the bank.
Section 201.021(1) of the Florida Statutes (1975) provides that
a surtax shall be paid on the amount of consideration paid and that
"the consideration ... shall not include amounts of existing mort-
gages on the real estate sold." In a case of first impression, this
statute has been construed to mean that if there is an existing
143. Spencer v. American Advisory Corp., 338 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
144. Tamiami Abstract & Title Co. v. Berman, 324 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
145. Willark House, S.A. v. Espinosa, 328 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
146. Peoples Downtown Nat'l Bank v. Lawyers Title Guar. Fund, 334 So. 2d 105 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1976).
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mortgage on the property sold and the new buyer assumes and
agrees to pay it and the mortgagee releases the seller (the original
mortgagor) from liability as a result of this assumption agreement,
then the surtax is not to be based on the total sales price but only
on the price over and above the existing mortgage.'47 It is interesting
to note that the court expressly refused to follow an attorney gen-
eral's opinion'48 and a Department of Revenue Rule to the con-
trary.' 9
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that when a corporation
conveys real property to its president and sole stockholder by a
quitclaim deed which shows that the property is subject to a pur-
chase money mortgage held by another, the transfer shows a shifting
of economic burden in the paying of the mortgage from the corpora-
tion to the grantee. As a result, the transaction is subject to the tax
prescribed by section 201.02 of the Florida Statutes (1975) even
though the grantee does not assume and agree to pay the mort-
gage. 15
0
Inasmuch as there is no Florida statute requiring the attesta-
tion of a mortgage, the District Court of Appeal, Second District,
has held that at least in the case of nonhomestead property the
signatures of two witnesses are not necessary to validate a mort-
gage.'5 ' The court noted that prior to the 1972 amendments to the
Florida Constitution, case law required two witnesses on a mortgage
encumbering homestead property, but the court, in dictum, ad-
vanced the thought that since the present Constitution has omitted
the former words "duly executed,"' 52 it would seem to indicate that
a nonwitnessed mortgage on homestead property would be valid.
The court also held that when the mortgagors sign various forms
submitted to them under the "truth in lending laws," they cannot
later claim that they were not adequately advised of their rights on
the basis that they did not read the papers, unless they can show
that they were prevented from reading the papers.
147. Leadership Housing, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 336 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1976).
148. (1973) FLA. Arr'y GEN. ANNUAL RPp. 114.
149. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 12A-4.13(25) (1973).
150. Florida Dep't of Revenue v. De Maria, 338 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1976).
151. Reliable Fin. Co. v. Axon, 336 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).




Mortgagees who collect money from mortgagors for deposit in
escrow accounts for the payments of taxes are now required to pay
the taxes promptly in order to take advantage of the maximum tax
discount. If the escrow account is not sufficient to pay the taxes, the
mortgagee must notify the mortgagor of the deficit within fifteen
days after the mortgagee receives notification of the taxes from the
tax collector.'53
VII. SURETIES AND GUARANTORS
Normally, if a person orally promises to pay the debt of an-
other, the promise is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds,
section 725.01 of the Florida Statutes (1975). A guaranty is not
within the statute when the guarantor of a construction loan to a
corporation makes his guaranty in return for the lender's oral prom-
ise to pay the guarantor a mortgage owed to the guarantor by the
borrowing corporation from the construction draws to be disbursed
to the lender.'54 This oral promise of the lender is supported by the
consideration of the guarantor's guaranty. Furthermore, it would
appear that if the promisor were to make his oral promise in return
for a promise of the creditor to forebear in suing the principal
debtor, the oral promise might be enforceable. ' On the other hand,
if the oral promise were to pay the debt in installments which would
take approximately eight years to pay, the promise would not be one
to be performed within one year, and it would be barred under
another provision of the statute.
Under UCC section 3-415"'1 when co-makers of. a promissory
note are sued by the payee, the co-makers may use parol evidence
to show that they were accommodation makers for the benefit of the
payee and, therefore, not liable to him." 7
Parol evidence is not admissible to prove the meaning of a
guaranty agreement when it is free from any ambiguity.'5 ' Further,
when the corporate debtor delivers possession of the mortgaged real
153. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-12.
154. Johnson v. Barnett Bank, 320 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
155. Goldstein v. ABCO Constr. Co., 334 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
156. FLA. STAT. § 673.415 (1975).
157. Gehrig v. Ray, 332 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
158. MacCulley v. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 335 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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property to the lender, this does not prevent the lender from filing
foreclosure proceedings or from obtaining a deficiency judgment
against the guarantors who were officers and owners of the corporate
debtor.
An attorney's fee of $8,000 awarded on a $22,356.46 judgment
based on a guaranty agreement is a reasonable one rather that a fee
of $15,000 awarded by the trial court. "The cases are clear that while
the opinion of an expert witness testifying on attorney's fees is per-
suasive, it is not binding on the court in determination of a reasona-
ble fee."' 59
A creditor must not deal with a debtor or a guarantor in such a
manner as to harm the interest of the guarantor. Therefore, when
the creditor sues the guarantor, the guarantor may file a counter-
claim which alleges that the creditor took control of the debtor
corporation and caused its financial failure and, further, that the
creditor took possession of all of the assets of the debtor corporation
and improperly conducted a sale of these assets which resulted in
insufficient funds to pay the debt.110
A grantee under a quitclaim deed from a corporation is not
liable for the payment of the usual amount of documentary stamp
taxes when the grantee was the absolute guarantor of payment of a
note and mortgage given by the corporation to a lender and the
conveyance was not made for any consideration.'
If a husband should use duress to force his wife to sign an
instrument to guarantee the payments of goods sold to a corporate
purchaser, this duress may be a good defense against the seller if he
had knowledge of it."2 In addition, if the seller could have recovered
the goods (building materials) from the buyer under section 713.15
of the Florida Statutes (1975) but did not do so, this also would be
a valid defense for the guarantor on the basis that the seller failed
to mitigate damages.
VIII. BANKS AND SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
In order for an alleged novation contract to be valid, it must be
supported byconsideration. In a recent case, a bank's accounts were
159. Ruwitch v. First Nat'l Bank, 327 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
160. Dorsy v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 334 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
161. Straughn v. Story, 334 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).




in a confused state since the bank was in liquidation. Thus, when
it entered into a letter agreement with a debtor which recited the
amount of principal which was to become due on a certain date but
failed to mention interest for this date (although it contained a
gratuitous agreement on the part of the liquidators to defer certain
itemized interest payments for the tax advantage of the debtor),
this letter agreement was not supported by consideration. Hence,
the debtor remained liable for the amount of the unpaid interest.'63
Federal banking law provides that no national bank may "be
the purchaser or holder of any such shares" of its own capital
stock.'64 This provision does not invalidate the will of a testator who
bequeaths capital stock to a national bank to enable it to sell the
shares to qualify directors to serve the bank.' 5
A. Bank Accounts
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that a cus-
tomer of a bank does not possess any fourth amendment rights in
his bank records.'66 Therefore, he cannot challenge subpoenas duces
tecum which were defectively issued and which resulted in the bank
turning over information dealing with his accounts to the govern-
ment. The Court was of the view that the customer has no legiti-
mate "expectation of privacy" ' 7 because his checks were not confi-
dential communications but negotiable instruments used in busi-
ness, and because the customer had voluntarily conveyed all of the
information to the bank employees.
A bank which mistakenly permits a husband who is a joint
tenant in a savings account with his wife, to withdraw the alleged
balance when the wife previously withdrew most of the money, may
recover from the husband the amount of withdrawal. This fact holds
true even though the wife accomplished the withdrawal without a
passbook since she had complied with the rules of the bank provid-
ing that withdrawals could be made without a passbook if approval
were obtained from a bank officer.'66
163. Garner v. Thompson, 335 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
164. 12 U.S.C. § 83 (1970).
165. First Nat'l Bank v. Young, 338 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
166. United States v. Miller, 96 S. Ct. 1619 (1976).
167. Id. at 1623-24.
168. Miranda v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank, 334 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
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B. Safety Deposit Boxes and Gifts
In a case of first impression in Florida, it has been held that the
mere leasing of a safety deposit box in a bank in the names of a
husband and wife, when the wife has never opened the box prior to
the death of her husband, is not enough to establish an estate by
the entireties in bearer bonds which were found in the box.'69 It has
additionally been held that the fact that a husband and wife take
title to a certificate of deposit as "husband or wife" is not deter-
minative that they took other than as tenants by the entirities.'70
Hence, testimony must be introduced to show the intent of the
parties.
C. Letters of Credit
A bank which has dishonored payment upon a letter of credit
is not liable for attorney's fees (taxed as costs) incurred by the
beneficiary when he successfully sues the bank. UCC sections 5-115,
2-710, 1-103, and 1-106(1)171 when construed together do not permit
an award or attorney's fees either as costs or as "commercially
reasonable charges, expenses or commissions."''
D. Garnishment
When A is a creditor of B and B has obtained a judgment
against C, A may not garnish this judgment by having a writ of
garnishment served on C when the judgment is based on an unliqui-
dated claim and the judgment is being appealed under supersedeas.
The trial court should not dissolve such a writ, but rather should
stay its proceedings until the appeal is decided.'
In another recent case, an in personam action was brought
against an alleged debtor by constructive service of process and
garnishment of an alleged debtor of the defendant.' Subsequently,
169. Bechtel v. Bechtel, 330 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
170. Norman v. Bank of Hawthorne, 321 So. 2d 112 (Fla. lst Dist. 1975).
171. FLA. STAT. §§ 675.115, 672.2-710, 671.101, 671.106(1) (1975).
172. Florida Nat'l Bank v. Alfred & Ann Goldstein Foundation, Inc., 327 So. 2d 110, 111
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1976). A stand-by letter of credit for $60,000 was used as a commitment fee
for the procuring of a construction loan in Levenson v. Barnett Bank, 330 So. 2d 192 (Fla. 3d
Dist. 1976). See Murray, Letters of Credit in Non Sale of Goods Transactions, 30 Bus. LAW.
1103 (1975).
173. Florida Steel Corp. v. A.G. Spanos Enterprises, Inc., 332 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1976).
174. Shannon v. Great S. Equip. Co., 326 So.2d 19 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976).
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default judgments were entered against both the defendant and the
garnishee. On appeal, the garnishee was held capable of setting
aside the garnishment on the grounds that the in personam judg-
ment against the defendant was void because of a lack of due pro-
cess. Therefore, no valid judgment in garnishment could be entered
against the garnishee.
E. Legislation
The Florida Banking Code was amended to provide that: (a)
applications to operate a branch bank or branch trust company
must be accompanied by a fee of $1,000; (b) a fee of $2,500 for
investigating and processing each application for a merger, consoli-
dation, or purchase of assets is required; (c) directors of a bank need
no longer be owners of shares of stock in the bank; (d) the depart-
ment no longer need furnish a list of approved securities; and (e) it
is unlawful for bank or trust company officers and directors to vio-
late willfully any of the provisions of the Banking Code and to
provide false information to the Department of Banking and Fi-
nance.'7 5 Further, another enactment includes: (a) a provision that
with the approval of the Department, state banks can make the
same kind of loans as national banks; (b) another provision that
department approval is now required for the acquisition of a control-
ling interest in a bank or trust company; (c) provisions articulating
the procedures for cease and desist orders by the Department; and
(d) provisions setting the procedures for the removal of officers and
directors, said procedures to be in accordance with chapter 120 of
the Florida Statutes (1975).171
Industrial savings banks may now with the approval of the
Department (based upon a satisfactory showing that the public con-
venience and necessity will be served thereby) establish up to two
branches per calendar year within the limits of the county in which
the parent bank is located.'77
Banks and trust companies may now invest up to five percent
of their unimpaired capital and surplus to purchase bonds or other
evidences of indebtedness of the State of Israel.7 Savings associa-
175. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-177, amending FLA. STAT. §§ 658.08, 659. 11, 659.141, 659.17,
659.53 (1975).
176. 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-178, amending FLA. STAT. § 659.14 (1975).
177. FLA. STAT. § 656.071 (Supp. 1976).
178. FLA. STAT. §§ 659.20, 665.361 (Supp. 1976).
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tions may likewise invest up to five percent of their net worth in
bonds of Israel.
When a trust service office is established by a trust company
at a bank which has trust powers, it may now retain these powers
and continue to exercise them. 79 In addition, a trust company which
is acting in a fiduciary capacity may now employ another trust
company as its agent to advise or assist it in the performance of its
duties as a principal and to render investment advice. Further, a
trust compnay acting in a fiduciary capacity may agree with an-
other trust company for the transfer of fiduciary relationships be-
tween them, provided the approval of a circuit court is obtained
after notice to beneficiaries and after a hearing if the beneficiaries
expressed any objections. 8 ' The court is directed to approve the
substitution unless it determines that it would be a material detri-
ment to the estate, trust or other fiduciary relationship, or to the
beneficiaries thereof.
Section 659.18 of the Florida Statutes (1975) was amended to
increase from $5,000 to $15,000 the maximum amount available for
loan by banks at the present six percent per annum discount or add-
on rate.' In addition, section 687.03 of the Florida Statutes (1975),
which pertains to usury, was amended to provide that it would not
apply to loans or commitments to insure, made by the Federal
Housing Administration, the Veterans' Administration, Federal
National Mortgage Association, Government National Mortgage
Association, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation and any
department, agency or instrumentality of the federal government,
or any of their successors.'
Section 657.06(3)(b) of the Florida Statutes (1975), relating to
credit unions, was amended to provide that all fees collected by the
state under part I of chapter 657 shall be deposited in the state
treasury in a special bank and trust company trust fund under the
Department of Banking and Finance.'83 Also, section 657.161(12) of
the Florida Statutes (1975) was amended to permit credit unions to
invest in the Southeast Corporate Federal Credit Union.'
179. FLA. STAT. § 659.061 (Supp. 1976).
180. FLA. STAT. §§ 660.011, 660.012 (Supp. 1976).
181. 1976 Fla. Laws ch 76-125, amending FLA. STAT. § 659.18 (1975).
182. FLA. STAT. § 687.03 (Supp. 1976).
183. FLA. STAT. § 657.06 (Supp. 1976).




A seller of goods who attempts to collect a portion of the pur-
chase price of the goods from the buyer when the seller knows that
the account has been paid (by repossession and sale of the goods for
more than the balance of the account), may be held liable to the
buyer under sections 559.55-.78 of the Florida Statutes (1975) for
actual damages incurred as the result of this wrongful collection
practice, or for $500, whichever is greater, together with court costs
and reasonable attorney's fees. These sections of the Florida Stat-
utes, although primarily directed toward collection agencies, apply
to any person engaging in unlawful collection of consumer claims. '
In a consistent vein, a small loan company comes within the
meaning of the word "person," and can be held liable for damages
for prohibited activities in the collection of an unpaid loan.,"6
A professional medical association which attempts to collect its
allegedly unpaid bills by sending simulated judicial complaints to
former patients may also be held liable for the sum of $500 together
with attorney's fees and court costs under sections 559.72(10) and
559.77(1) of the Florida Statutes (1975).111 If the recipients of these
''complaints" can prove that the association's conduct was wanton,
malicious, or gross and outrageous, punitive damages might be
awarded. In the instant case, the plaintiff was unable to prove such
a course of conduct and was denied punitive damages by the appel-
late court, although the trial court had awarded $12,000 punitive
damages.
A bank which on one occasion refused to inform a credit bureau
of the true amount (some $500) owed to it rather than the repre-
sented amount of $1,700 and then later corrected the quoted amount
to $585 may be held liable for slander of credit as libel per se.188 In
order to award punitive damages it would not be necessary to prove
actual malice. Since it was libel per se, punitive damages could be
awarded without an award of compensatory damages.
Section 559.72(4) of the Florida Statutes (1975), which forbids
a creditor from communicating with the debtor's employer prior to
obtaining a final judgment against the debtor unless the debtor
185. Williams v. Streeps Music Co., 333 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
186. Cook v. Blazer Fin. Serv., Inc., 332 So. 2d 677 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
187. Steiner & Munach, P.A. v. Williams, 334 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
188. Matthews v. Deland State Bank, 334 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
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gives his written permission to communicate with the employer or
acknowledges in writing the existence of the debt after it has been
placed for collection, has been upheld as constitutional by the Su-
preme Court of Florida. 189 It was argued that the statute infringed
on the creditor's right of free speech. The court held that the public
interest in preventing harassment of a debtor through communica-
tion with his employer transcends a creditor's interest in using his
speech to the employer as a means of collection. Further, the court
held that the Act's minimum damage provision is not a taking of
the creditor's property without due process. The damage provision
is sustainable both because it provides for liquidated damages in a
situation in which it is most difficult to ascertain actual damages
and constitutes a form of punitive damages designed to dissuade
consumer collection agencies from engaging in forbidden conduct.
The Florida Consumer Finance Act has been amended to pro-
vide that the lender may now charge a maximum of thirty percent
per annum interest on the first $500 (rather than the first $300);
twenty-four percent per annum on that amount exceedin $500 and
not exceeding $1,000 (rather than $300 and $600), and sixteen per-
cent per annum on that amount exceeding $1,000 (rather than
$600) .190
The Federal Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, effective March 23,
1976,° ' and the regulations thereunder (Federal Reserve Board Reg-
ulation Z),112 require the lessors of personal property for lessees'
personal, family, or household uses for periods in excess of four
months to make disclosures in the following matters before the les-
see enters into the lease:
(a) the identification of the property leased (car, boat, etc.);
(b) the down payment amount, security deposit, etc. charged at
the beginning of the lease;
(c) the amounts of incidental fees charged, if any; and
(d) the number, amount and dates of the lease payments to-
gether with the total sum charged for lease payments.
The lease form is also required to disclose the insurance involved,
189. Harris v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 338 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1976).
190. Ch. 76-180, S.B. No. 785, amending FLA. STAT. § 516.031 (1975).
191. Consumer Leasing Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-240, 90 Stat. 257 (1976), amending
15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
192. Fed. Res. Board Reg. Z, Fed. Reg. 45537 (Oct. 15, 1976).
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as well as any express warranties made by the lessor or a manufac-
turer of the leased product.
In addition to the Consumer Leasing Act, Congress also enacted
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act' as amended "' which was sup-
plemented by Federal Reserve Board Regulation B.115 The purpose
of this act is to prevent discrimination in any credit transaction on
the basis of sex, marital status, age, race, color, religion, or national
origin of any applicant for credit. The act can be enforced by a
victim, who may recover actual as well as punitive damages, or by
the Attorney General. The Truth in Lending Act was also amended
to provide for the Fair Credit Billing Act19 designed to allow the
consumer an opportunity to correct billing errors in open-end credit
under credit cards and revolving charge accounts. Under the Act the
onus is placed on creditors to disclose the procedure required to
correct billing errors.
It is suggested that if experience under the Truth in Lending
Act is any indication, the economic costs of these acts will far out-
weigh any benefits. Of course, these economic costs will be passed
on to the consumer.
X. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. Venue
When the defendant's only place of business is in Escambia
County, Florida, and it signs a security agreement providing for
payments in said county, the proper venue is in Escambia County
and not in Broward County when the plaintiff sues upon the com-
mon count for money had and received, rather than upon the secu-
rity agreement itself.' 7
Federal law provides that suits against national banks may be
brought within the district in which the bank is established or lo-
cated.' If a foreign national bank repossesses a car (in which it
193. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1521 et seq. (1974).
194. Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-239, 90 Stat.
251 (1976).
195. Fed. Res. Board Reg. B, 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1976).
196. Fair Credit Billing Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1500 (1974), amending 15
U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
197. Pensacola Restaurant Supply Co. v. Byrn Mawr Camp Resorts, Inc., 320 So. 2d 35
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
198. 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1970).
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holds a security interest) by employing a repossessing company, suit
may be brought against the bank in the county in which the repos-
session occurs.'99 The transaction of business (repossession) and
commission of a tortious act through a Florida agent (repossessor)
constitutes a waiver of the bank's right to assert the statute.
B. Perfection and Priorities
In a case of first impression in Florida,2N it has been held that
the issuance of a promissory note and the subsequent proper execu-
tion and filing of the "Notice of Lien" form supplied by the State
of Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Divi-
sion of Motor Vehicles, perfects a security interest in motor vehicles
without the filing of a financing statement under UCC section 9-
102(1)(a) and 9-302(3)(d)21' and section 319.27(2) of the Florida
Statutes (1975).
A security interest in a car perfected under Florida law by recor-
dation on the title certificate remains valid under UCC section 9-
103(4) 101 in Connecticut where the car was operated for a period of
nine months before the owner went bankrupt.0 3 The interest was
held perfected even though the creditor knew that the car was in
Connecticut, had accepted payments from the debtor while she was
in Connecticut, and even though the creditor had constructive no-
tice that Connecticut law requires registration of the car in the state
within sixty days of coming within the state.
Under the 1962 version of the UCC a creditor who has properly
perfected his security interest in property of the debtor is not re-
quired to file an amended financing statement when the debtor
changes his name. Under a proposed change (1972 draft of the UCC)
to UCC section 9-402,204 a creditor would have to file a new financing
statement in the new name of the debtor if the original filing would




199. Vann v. First Nat'l Bank, 324 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
200. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Consolidated Suppliers, Inc., 332 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1st Dist.
1976).
201. FLA. STAT. §§ 679.102(1)(a), 679.302(3)(b) (1975).
202. FLA. STAT. § 679.103(4) (1975).
203. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Ossen (In re Maxwell), Bank No. H-75-225 (D. Conn.
1975) reported in 18 U.C.C. Rptr. 504.
204. FLA. STAT § 679.312(5)(b) (1975).
205. Avdoyan v. Sunbank (In re Sofa Centre, Inc.), No. 74-377-ORL-P (M.D. Fla. 1975)
reported in 18 U.C.C. Rptr. 536.
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In a case of first impression in Florida (and perhaps of first
impression in the United States) it has been held that the holder of
a subsequently perfected security interest in motel furnishings, fix-
tures and other goods used in the motel has priority over a previ-
ously recorded property mortgage which covered the same goods.
The court so held even though the real property mortgage holder
filed suit to foreclose and filed a lis pendens against the subject
motel prior to the filing of the financing statement of the perfected
security interest holder. The court chose to follow the view that
UCC section 9-312(5)(b)06 sets out the rules of priority, and it is
not to be affected by the pre-Code lis pendens rules.0 7
In Florida and in approximately eleven other states a writ of
execution becomes a lien on personal property from the time the
writ is delivered to the sheriff and not from the time the sheriff
actually physically attaches the debtor's goods. For example, A de-
livers a writ of execution to the sheriff on March 18. On April 7, B
executes and mails a notice of lien to the Division of Motor Vehicles
for notation on the certificate of title to a car owned by the debtor
of A and B. On April 10, the certificate of title is issued showing the
lien filed on April 7. On April 8, C delivers its writ of execution
against the same debtor to the sheriff. What is the priority between
A, B and C? Since the notice of lien becomes a lien on a car when
it is filed on April 10, as a result of the general execution rule, the
parties have priority in the order of A, C and B. 201 Under this non-
sensical rule, a non-purchase money security interest lender who
innocently perfects one minute after a writ of execution has been
placed in the hands of the sheriff will take subject to this writ. In
more modern states, the priority of the judgment creditor would
date from the time that the sheriff made his levy of execution, not
the earlier time when the sheriff received the writ.
A judicially appointed receiver of a motel (in a motel foreclo-
sure action) is a "lien creditor" under UCC section 9-301.211 Thus,
he has priority over open-account unsecured creditors who furnished
goods to the motel prior to his appointment.2 10
206. FLA. STAT. § 679.312(5)(b) (1975).
207. National Bank of Sarasota v. Dugger, 335 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1976). The court
reasoned that to give the mortgage priority based on the filing of a lis pendens would result
in a method of perfection uncontemplated and unintended by the drafters of the UCC.
208. Bank of Hawthorne v. Shepherd, 330 So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
209. FLA. STAT. § 679.301 (1975).
210. Zirot v. Gilmer, 336 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
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A paid surety which completes a construction contract has an
equitable right of subrogation to the rights of the owner to withhold
payments from the contractor upon its default and to receive pay-
ments from the owner which would otherwise be paid to the default-
ing contractor. This equitable right of subrogation is not a security
interest under Article 9 of the UCC, '1 and, therefore, need not be
perfected by the filing of a financing statement in order to be pro-
tected even as against the trustee in bankruptcy of the contractor.'"
Under UCC section 9-31013 a mechanic in Florida who performs
work on a boat which is subject to a prior security interest has a
possessory lien which has priority over the security interest. The lien
statute provides, however, that the possessory lien of the mechanic
continues "so long as the possession continues, not to exceed three
months after performance of the labor or furnishing the materi-
als."2 ' The quoted language inexplicably has been interpreted to
mean that if the owner of the boat leaveg it in the poggeggion of the
mechanic lienor, then the lien continues as against the security
interest holder. Further, if the lienor files suit to foreclose five
months after the work has been completed, he may enforce his lien
against the owner and the security interest holder.' 5
C. Defenses
UCC section 9-2061e has made its maiden voyage in Florida,
and, from the standpoint of the financing community, it was a
successful trip. A purchaser purchased an open road motor home to
be used for business purposes. The installment-purchase contract
(security agreement) which was executed by the buyer and assigned
to a bank provided that the buyer was to perform all of his cove-
nants without regard to any claims which he might have against the
seller and that the buyer would look only to the seller for perform-
ance of warranties, etc. The buyer paid for about a year and then
defaulted. The bank brought a replevin suit after accelerating the
balance due on the security agreement. The buyer claimed that the
211. FLA. STAT. §§ 679 et seq. (1975).
212. McAtee v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 401 F. Supp. 11 (N.D. Fla. 1975).
213. FA. STAT. § 679.310 (1975).
214. FLA. STAT. § 713.74 (1975).
215. Eastern Airlines Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Lauderdale Yacht Basin, Inc., 334
So. 2d 175 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
216. FiA. STAT. § 679.206 (1975).
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motor home wag sold to him as a new one when in fact it was used
and that it had to be returned to the seller for numerous defects
which had never been corrected. The court held that under 9-206 the
buyer's waiver of defenses was valid and effective because the bank
did not have a close connection with the seller-dealer, that the bank
took the assignment from the dealer in good faith for value and
without knowledge of any claims or defenses, and that the buyer
made payments for a year without notifying the bank of any of the
alleged defects. As a result, the bank was entitled to replevy the
motor home."1 7 As previously discussed," 8 the Federal Trade Com-
mission's rule which provides that the holder of a consumer credit
contract is subject to all claims and defenses which the consumer
could assert against the seller of the goods will eliminate the effect
of 9-206 in consumer cases. Cases such as the instant case will not
be affected by the rule, however, because the motor home was
bought for business purposes.
The fact that borrowers were forced to sign a renewal promis-
sory note, a security agreement and a real property mortgage as the
result of "duress" involving the lender's threats to enforce rights
through court proceedings on the original obligation, does not con-
stitute legal duress sufficient to raise a defense to the enforcement
of these instruments. 19 Further, any verbal abuse exercised by the
lender to induce the borrowers to sign these instruments would not
constitute a defense. In addition, the court implied that if the
amended pledge agreement purportedly gave the pledgee the right
to sell pledged paintings at any price unilaterally decided upon by
the pledgee, this clause would not be in violation of UCC section 9-
50120 because the amended pledge agreement authorized this ac-
tion, and the borrowers "destroyed any previous defense they may
have had on this point by the execution of the amended pledge
agreement." '' It is submitted that the court was attempting to state
that a debtor may waive his rights after default in accordance with
UCC sections 9-501, 9-504, 9-505, 9-506.22
217. Are v. Barnett Bank, 330 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
218. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
219. Spillers v. Five Points Guar. Bank, 335 So. 2d 851 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1976).
220. FLA. STAT. § 679.501 (1975).
221. 335 So. 2d at 853.
222. FLA. STAT. §§ 679.501, 679.504-506 (1975).
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D. Repossessions and Collections
A repossessing security interest holder who fails to file notice
of sale under UCC section 9-504(3)223 may not recover a deficiency
from the co-signer (apparently an accommodation co-signer) of the
security agreement." 4 Similarly, guarantors of a secured promissory
note who guarantee payment by means of a separate agreement
(rather than an indorsement on the note) are to be considered debt-
ors within the meaning of UCC sections 9-105(1)(d) and 9-504(5)21"
and are entitled to reasonable notice prior to the sale of the collat-
eral. If notice is not given, the secured party may not secure a
deficiency judgment against the guarantors.22
In a rather convoluted opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida
has apparently recognized that the UCC has done away with the old
election of remedies doctrine. Thus, a creditor now may sue for the
balance of unpaid installments on a security agreement and also
seek replevin of the encumbered goods."'
It is reversible error to enjoin the sale under UCC section 9-
50425 of a promissory note given as collateral in the absence of (a)
verified pleadings, affidavits or sworn testimony; (b) a bond; and (c)
any showing that irreparable injury would occur if the injunction
were not granted. 29
If a security agreement authorizes the creditor to enter the
premises where a motor vehicle is located and take possession of it,
entry by an agent of the creditor who did not enter into any building
(only the hood of the car was in a car port) and who quietly removed
the car (the keys were left in the ignition) did not constitute an
unlawful trespass or breach of the peace. Nevertheless, because the
debtor had a history of late payments which were accepted by the
creditor without repossession, there may have been a duty for the
creditor to notify the debtor before carrying out the repossession.230
Summary judgment may be entered in favor of a secured party
223. FLA. STAT. § 679.504(3) (1975).
224. Washington v. First Nat'l Bank, 332 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
225. FLA. STAT. §§ 679.105(1)(d), 679.504(5) (1975).
226. Hepworth v. Orlando Bank & Trust Co., 323 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
227. Encore, Inc. v. Olivetti Corp. of America, 326 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1976), aff'g, 291 So.
2d 27 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
228. FLA. STAT. § 679.504 (1975).
229. City Nat'l Bank v. Somerset Dev. Corp., 330 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1976).
230. Raffa v. Dania Bank, 321 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
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who seeks a deficiency judgment when the facts show that he ex-
erted an honest effort to secure the highest price that the market
would bear for the collateral, a used construction machine.1
31
When a buyer of inventory goods asserts as a defense to an
action for replevin brought by the person who claims a security
interest in the inventory in the hands of the seller, that it is a buyer
in the ordinary course of business under UCC sections 9-307(1) and
1-201(9)3 1 and this defense is not controverted, the security interest
holder is not entitled to a summary judgment.1
33
E. Legislation
Statutory replevin has been substantially changed by the elimi-
nation of temporary restraining orders under former sections
78.055(6),234 78.069,31 and 78.073 21 of the Florida Statutes. In lieu
of the restraining order approach, a petitioner may now secure a
prejudgment issue of a writ of replevin and obtain a seizure of the
goods when the nature of the claim, the amount thereof and the
grounds clearly appear from specific facts in the verified petition or
by a separate affidavit of the petitioner. The prejudgment writ of
replevin may issue if the court finds from the verified petition or
affidavit that the defendant "is engaging in, or is about to engage
in conduct that may place the claimed property in danger of de-
struction, concealment, waste, removal from the state, removal
from the jurisdiction of the court, or transfer to an innocent pur-
chaser, during the pendency of the action, or that the defendant has
failed to make payment as agreed. ,131 The emphasized words are of
particular importance in the ordinary security interest repossession
case. The petitioner must post bond in the amount of twice the
value of the goods or twice the balance of the amount remaining due
and owing (whichever is less) as security for the payment of dam-
ages if the writ is obtained wrongfully. The defendant may obtain
release of the goods by posting within five days of the serving of the
writ a bond in the amount of one and one-fourth times the amount
231. Schatten v. C.I.T. Corp., 335 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
232. FLA. STAT. §§ 679.307(1), 671.201(9) (1975).
233. Johnson & Kirby, Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 338 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1976).
234. FLA. STAT. § 78.055(6) (1973) (amended 1976).
235. Repealed 1976.
236. Repealed 1976.
237. 1975 Fla. Sess. Law Serv., Ch. 76-19, § 78.068(2) (emphasis added).
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due on the agreement. The prejudgment writ can issue only upon
the signed order of a judge of the circuit or county court. If the
defendant does not choose to post a bond, he can file a
"contradictory motion '2 38 within ten days after service of the writ
and obtain the dissolution of the writ unless the petitioner proves
the grounds upon which the writ was issued. Such a motion is to be
set down for an immediate hearing.
Section 78.02 of the Florida Statutes (1975)39 has been
amended to provide that when the goods have been retained by or
redelivered to the defendant on his forthcoming bond, he may re-
cover attorney's fees as well as costs and damages, if any, from the
petitioner in replevin.
For purposes of the homestead exemption from forced sale, the
head of the family status, required to qualify, shall inure to the
benefit of the surviving tenant by the entireties or spouse of the
owner. This status "shall inure to the surviving spouse irrespective
of the fact that there are not two persons living together as one
family under the direction of one of them who is recognized as the
head of the family."240
238. Id.
239. 1975 Fla. Sess. Law Serv., Ch. 76-19, § 78.20.
240. 1976 Fla. Sess. Law Serv., Ch. 76-36, § 222.19(2).
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